getting philosophic with the omegaverse
whether or not i think philosophers i've read like the omegaverse (this time with some explanation)
What do you get when you cross a philosophy student and one of TikTok’s resident omegaverse experts? A miniseries called “Whether or Not I Think Philosophers I’ve Read Would Like the Omegaverse (with little to no explanation),” of course.
In light of graduating in May 2025 with a BA in liberal arts, there’s no better time for this compilation. It is both a look back at my work and the texts that I read and an excuse for self-indulgent rambling about concepts of the omegaverse.
This list spans centuries, beginning with the Ancient Greeks and ending with the early to mid 1900s, and features prominent philosophers and thinkers from the Great Books of the Western World. In addition to philosophers, there are some other writers—such as mathematicians and theologians—included on the list. If a particular author or work is not included, it is because I either have not read them, or because I did not read them for class.
While most of these opinions are very much just vibe based, the vibes were influenced by my personal opinions on their writing and ideas. Basically, the more thoughts I have about a philosopher, the more developed and in depth my opinions on their (hypothetical) opinions are. And because variety is the spice of life or whatever, there are a few significantly longer entries—because God knows I love to go on ad nauseam about my opinions—about both particular philosophers/ideas and particular aspects of the never-ending possibilities presented by the omegaverse.
Grab your rainbow hats, and without further ado, I present the new and improved “Whether or Not I Think Philosophers I’ve Read Would Like the Omegaverse (this time with some explanation).”
Plato: Not only would Plato like the omegaverse, he would also be pro-omega. In the Republic, when talking about the golden-souled Philosopher Kings, I can easily see him arguing for an omega led society, with omegas often being correlated with the golden soul. He would have a lot of thoughts about the Forms of the subgenders, and I think the omegaverse could very easily be worked into the Allegory of the Cave. One way that comes to mind for me is by incorporating scents—or lack thereof. Because they have only ever seen the shadows projected onto the wall, there would be no scent association, and they have hardly been able to scent each other because the scent glands are covered by their chains.
Aristotle: While I don’t see Aristotle having many thoughts about the omegaverse, given that his writings on classifications and hierarchy, I think he would lean more towards liking it than disliking it.
Paul the Apostle: Absolutely not. Much of the misogyny still found within the church can be traced back to Paul’s New Testament writings, and although this would translate very easily into an omegaverse setting that explores societal hierarchies through the lens of alphas and omegas, his clear dislike and disapproval of anything remotely sexual means that he would hate the omegaverse on principle. Of course, not all omegaverse fics contain any sexual content, but many of them do, and the genre’s origin is a slashfic about men getting fucked and knotted, it’s more than enough to take it completely off the table for Paul.
Epictetus: Yeah, probably. It’s more likely that he would like it than that he wouldn’t.
Lucretius: Yes. It would be very easy to add subgenders into his discussion of mind and soul within the physical body.
Plotinus: Yes, in part because he was a neoplatonist. I think he would also find a way to tie inherent alpha and omega instincts to the Monad.
Augustine of Hippo: Absolutely the fuck not. Here we have an interesting case where someone’s opinion of the omegaverse takes a complete 180. Prior to his conversion, Augustine would have loved the omegaverse. After, however, there would almost certainly be a very long chapter about it in the Confessions.
Anselm of Canterbury: No. He was the first to propose the ontological argument for the existence of God, and I do not like the ontological argument. Also, although he tends towards neoplatonism like Plotinus, like with Paul and Augustine, the whole Catholic thing would probably throw a wrench in there. But mostly, I just really really dislike the ontological argument.
Thomas Aquinas: No. Over my dead fucking body. I wrote my sophomore year major paper on the “Treatise on Grace” in the Summa Theologica, partially because I have so many fundamental issues with it, and partially because for a guy who’s been dead for over 750 years I truly have an insane amount of beef with him. But we’re here to talk about the omegaverse—maybe the fact that according to him, you need to have faith in order to get to Heaven, you have the free will to choose not to believe in God, and grace is necessary in order to have faith, but grace isn’t something that you can inherently possess or attain, it must be actively given to you by God; if God actively chooses not to give someone grace, meaning that they have no chance of going to Heaven, regardless of any choice they will ever make. Number one, that sounds a lot like predestination and therefore a lack of free will, and number two, it implies that God is not a benevolent, all-loving, or good God, otherwise why would he not save everyone from eternal suffering and damnation? Is such a god even deserving of worship?—and philosophy, not my religious trauma and daddy issues combo.
Machiavelli: Maybe. Either way, alpha supremacy would definitely come up in The Prince.
Montaigne: Yeah, why not.
Bacon: No. I don’t know, vibes.
Calvin: Absolutely not.
Hobbes: I don’t think he would like the omegaverse, but I do think it fits in with his idea of the state of nature, and I could absolutely see him utilizing it to get people to agree with him, like what he does with Christianity in Leviathan (basically, he says that citizens must obey the sovereign except where it would violate their obedience to God, but obedience to God consists of obedience to the sovereign). I don’t know how that would work, but I’m sure he would find a way.
Hume: Probably.
Descartes: No. I think he’s too concerned with existence to worry about the omegaverse. Also, I don’t like him for several reasons, one of them being his “cogito, ergo sum” argument as a proof for existence. For better or worse I am a big fan of Nietzsche, and chapter 16 in part one of Beyond Good and Evil has a very interesting and compelling argument against “cogito, ergo sum.”
Although there are many excerpts I could quote and subsequently discuss, there are two that stand out: “That ‘immediate certainty [such as “I think” or “I will”],’ as well as ‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing in itself,’ involve a contradictio in adjecto [contradiction between the noun and the adjective].” “In short, the assertion ‘I think’ assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what is; on account of this retrospective connection with further ‘knowledge,’ it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me.” [Walter Kaufmann translation].
As a final thought about Descartes, this is the first (and by far most godawful) thing that pops into my head whenever I hear his name. A horse walks into a bar. The bartender looks at him and says, “You’re in here a lot, I think you might be an alcoholic.” “I don’t think I am,” the horse answers, and immediately disappears. This, of course, is because of Descartes’s famous proof, “cogito, ergo sum,” but I couldn’t have explained that first because that would have been putting Descartes before de horse.
La Rochefoucauld: Yes.
Pascal: No. You may notice a theme emerging here, as the subject of my major junior year paper was Pascal’s Wager, specifically why I hate it as an argument for why you should believe in God. I have so many issues with it, but for the sake of brevity I’ll summarize a few of them: According to Catholic dogma, simply saying “I believe in God/Jesus/the articles of faith” isn’t sufficient for salvation. Pascal presents a logic based argument, but the entire thing is built on a false dichotomy. Pascal says that you can either believe in God or not believe in God, and after death there is either nothingness or Heaven and Hell. His argument hinges on specifically the Christian God and the Christian afterlife existing. Otherwise, the entire thing falls apart. What happens if you, having nothing to lose, wager that God does exist, but it is a different god or gods, belief system and values, and afterlife or lack thereof that actually exists?
Locke: Yes.
Spinoza: Maybe. Probably. Things get tricky with the way he talks about substance.
Galileo: Yes. I could also see him making Salviati (his position) an omega and Simplicio (the Church’s/his early position) an alpha in Two New Sciences simply for shits and giggles.
Newton: No, but only because of the general scholium at the end of the Principia where he ties it all back to God by saying, “Look at how well everything in nature works. Clearly it must be the Christian God.” If it weren’t for that, he would probably be on board with the omegaverse.
Leibniz: Yes. (In part because doing Leibnizian calculus was so much easier and more fun than Newtonian calculus, and I’m a petty motherfucker.)
Kant: God no.
Adam Smith: No. He’s often called the father of capitalism, and in my opinion, a lot of the omegaverse is incredibly easily compatible with socialism and/or communism.
Rousseau: Not only would Rousseau like the omegaverse, he would love it. Partially because he was a proto-socialist, or at least influenced future socialist thought, and partially because he mentions wolves at one point in On the Origin of Inequality and the omegaverse is closely related to werewolves and tangentially related to the debunked theory of how wolf packs function.
Dedekind: Yes.
Cantor: Yes. I love Cantor because set theory is so satisfying (before it gets complicated, at least), and the omegaverse provides even more possible sets.
Hegel: No, if only because he’s so fucking convoluted and confusing for no goddamn reason.
de Tocqueville: No.
Lobachevsky: Probably, but who knows. Given how confusing I find non-Euclidean geometry, it was hard to get a good read.
Marx: He’s easily in the top five omegaverse enjoyers on this list. The omegaverse works very well with communism, especially pack dynamics. Packs are based around community, where everyone contributes to the overall welfare of the pack from their abilities, with their individual abilities often correlated with their subgender, and in return the needs of everyone are met. That’s communism 101, baby. From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs. I may or may not be planning a very long omegaverse story about this, but who knows if it will ever make it to paper, or else just go to die in the back of my mind with countless other fully fleshed out plots that I just never got around to.
Engels: Of course, he would also be down with the omegaverse, but not quite as much as Marx.
Kierkegaard: No. The pattern returns, as I wrote my thesis on Fear and Trembling, specifically about my vehement disagreement over his defense and praise of Abraham. While my incredibly complicated thoughts about the story of Abraham and Isaac are based heavily on the story itself and the subsequent implications, the majority of my focus was on Kierkegaard’s logical breakdown of Abraham’s characterization with respect to the structure, content, and conclusions of his arguments themselves. There are some areas that I would not have thought to disagree with, were it not for him bringing them up, and there are others that I had well before I read his work. The following is the abstract of the paper:
Kierkegaard’s defense of Abraham is built on a distinction between murder and sacrifice, the absolute duty that a person has to God, and the possibility for the ethical, his name for the universal morality possessed by Man, to be suspended for a higher purpose. He presents the reader with two certainties: that Abraham loved Isaac, and that Abraham fully intended to kill Isaac. It is his faith that allows these two certainties to coexist, and that elevates his actions. It is his absolute duty to God that supersedes the duty that the father has to his son, a duty that Kierkegaard calls “the highest and the holiest.” And it is his faith and obedience that allows him, in transgressing the ethical, to suspend it, thereby solving the incompatibility for the ethical expression for his actions—that he hated Isaac and intended to murder him—and the religious—that he loved Isaac and intended to sacrifice him.
Kierkegaard’s admiration of Abraham necessitates the power of faith and God to transform his actions and allow them to be viewed in a different, better light—not as murder but as sacrifice, not as hatred but love, not as a failing of paternal duty but as a fulfilling of absolute duty. The events on Mount Moriah were not mortal sins, they were a test of faith. Faith can change the way they are viewed, the words used to talk about them, but nothing can change the fact that the ethical expressions for Abraham’s actions are still very much true. And I for one am unable to shake the horror of this reality, to view Abraham exclusively through the lens of faith, or to forget that—although he loved him—he had every intent to murder Isaac.
The paper itself can be boiled down to the assertion that religion is not an inherently valid justification for things, the idea that it is is both foolish and dangerous, and demonstrates a fundamentally misunderstanding of religion as a construct if used as one. And that the daddy issues will get you before you even put together why you didn’t end up breaking the cycle of religious papers about faith, free will, and the existence of God. Because an analysis of Marx and Rousseau and gender and gender as a performance in Shakespeare’s As You Like It have absolutely nothing on a father deliberately and actively choosing religion over his own son.
Bachelard: Yes. There would be a chapter in The Poetics of Space on nests. There’s already a chapter on bird nests, but I can very easily see a chapter on omegaverse nesting between chapters 3 (drawers, chests and wardrobes) and 4 (nests), where he talks about the safety and intimacy of nesting as it relates to space in general, the home, and the universe.
Nietzsche: Yes. And I would be on board with everything he talked about with respect to the omegaverse, until he gets to omegas, because I think it would probably be a similar thing to his wild misogyny towards the end of Beyond Good and Evil.
Einstein: Yes.
Darwin: Yes. He would have so many theories of how the subgenders evolved. One idea that comes to mind is a biological BDSM fic (an alternate universe that already shares many similarities with the omegaverse) I read a while ago, in which the designations (Dom and sub) evolved long ago from subgenders (alpha and omega).
Freud: Unfortunately, he would be obsessed. The only rule of the omegaverse is that there are no rules, and while there’s no wrong way to do the omegaverse, there is one exception, and that exception is Freud. Nothing good can ever come from the unholy union of the omegaverse and Freudian psychosexual developmental theories. The following is a list of my theories about Freud’s opinions on the omegaverse:
He would exclusively enjoy male alpha/female omega omegaverse, perhaps going as far as to prescribe bitching and/or studding for female alphas and male omegas. He might talk about how having an alpha mother or an omega father affects their children’s psychosexual development. Regardless, he’d be weird about it. He would have so much more to say about the five stages of psychosexual development (oral, anal, phallic, latent, and genital) as they relate to the different subgenders. In addition to girls experiencing penis envy, he would also talk about newly-presented omegas experiencing knot envy. The Oedipus and Electra complexes would be so much more complex. I could go on, but frankly, I don’t want to. The main takeaway is that we should all be thankful that Freud was long dead by the time of the omegaverse’s emergence.
Beauvoir: Yes.
Heidegger: No. He’s a Nazi. Enough said.
And finally, as a bonus, Diogenes: He would absolutely love it, and joins Marx and Freud in the top three omegaverse enthusiasts on this list.